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International Regulation of Air Pollution
by James H. Pannabecker*
I. Introduction
Two potentially conflicting concerns have achieved new promi-
nence during the 1970's: the necessity of an improved worldwide envi-
ronment, and the needs of developing nations for accelerated economic
development. The United States Congress began the decade by officially
recognizing the gravity of environmental problems in the National En-
vironmental Policy Act. ' During the next few years, the members of the
United Nations devoted a great deal of energy to preparations for the
U.N. Conference on the Human Environment at Stockholm, 2 and ulti-
mately adopted a resolution creating a new international environmental
agency, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 3
Concurrently, the influence of the Third World countries has ex-
panded markedly. A number of economists have characterized the
1970's as the "development decade," 4 suggesting that the developing
countries will finally be liberated from dependence upon the indus-
trialized nations. The accuracy of this prediction has been demonstrated
by recent Third World successes, such as the OPEC oil embargo and the
ability of the developing countries as a bloc to exercise influence within
the United Nations.5
* J.D. 1978, University of North Carolina School of Law.
42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1975).
2 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SAFEGUARDING OUR WORLD ENVIRONMENT: THE UN CON-
FERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT 5-7 (1972).See generally Report of the UN Confer-
ence on the Human Environment held at Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972, U.N. Doc.
AICONF./48/14 (1972). The Conference adopted, among other things, a Declaration on the
Human Environment and an Action Plan on the Environment. Id.
G.A. Res. 2997, 27 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda item 47), U.N. Doc. A18901
(1973). This resolution also set up the Environment Secretariat, the Environment Fund,
and the Environment Co-ordination Board.
4 Wheeler, Ecocatastrophe, ECOCIDE - AND THOUGHTS TOWARD SURVIVAL 9, 12 (C.
Fadiman & J. White eds. 1971).
s For example, the developing nations were able to get the new UNEP headquartered
.in .Nairobi. See Taubenfeld, International Environmental Law: Air and Outer Space, 13 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 315, 325 (1973).
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Many environmentalists in developed nations tend to view envi-
ronmental quality and development as competing and mutually exclusive
objectives. Developing countries are sometimes pictured as recreational
reserves on which strict environmental controls must be imposed. 6 Of
course, developing nations regard this attitude with distrust. 7 To them,
there are two types of pollution: (1) that associated with development,
and (2) that associated with lack of development - abject poverty,
slums and the concomitant social problems. 8 Because the latter type of
pollution can only be eliminated through industrial expansion and
higher incomes, the Third World has a very strong interest in develop-
ment. This interest is reflected in the concept of "ecodevelopment," 9
which attempts to balance the two branches of environmental concern
and which has gained the support of most developing nations. 10
This note focuses on the problem of international air pollution and
the measures available for its control. Throughout the discussion, the
dual nature of international environmental concerns must be recog-
nized. The neglect of either form of pollution will certainly destroy any
chance for successful international solution of air pollution problems.11
A. Physical Context
Pollution requires no visa to cross international boundaries. This
physical law has been dramatically illustrated by nuclear fallout 1 2 and
6 See Tarlack, Land Use Choice: National Prerogative vs. International Policy, 13 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 343, 350 (1973); Castro, Environment and Development: The Case of the Develop-
ing Countries, in WORLD Eco-CRIsIs: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN RESPONSE 237,
247-48 (D. Kay & E. Skolnikoff eds. 1972).
7 See Goldman, Pollution: International Complications, 2 ENVT'L AFF. 1, 8-9 (1972). The
developing countries view with hostility any attempt to impose upon them the standards
of a developed country. Taubenfeld, supra note 5, at 325. See U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE'S
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE 1972 U.N. CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT,
STOCKHOLM AND BEYOND 120 (1972).
8 Castro, supra note 6, at 248; RESHAPING THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER: A REPORT TO THE
CLUB OF ROME 19 (J. Tinbergen, A. Dolman & J. van Ettinger eds. 1976).
9 See the use of the term in UN Environment Programme, Report of the Executive
Director 86, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC/90 (1977).
10 See generally Report of the UN Conference on the Human Environment held at
Stockholm, supra note 2; G.A. Res. 2997, 27 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda item 47), U.N.
Doc. A/8901 (1973).
11 "Gresham's Law of the Environment" holds that poor pollution control tends to
drive out good pollution control. Thus, stringent pollution control in certain countries will
put domestic industries at such a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis producers in coun-
tries with lax pollution control, that repeal of the tough laws or passage of less stringent
laws is inevitable. Goldman, supra note 7, at 3.
12 The possible impact of nuclear fallout on infant mortality rates is discussed in
Sterngalss, Infant Mortality and Nuclear Tests, 25 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 18 (April 1969).
The story of United States nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands is documented in
Brownlie, A Survey of International Customary Rules of Environmental Protection, 13 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 179, 180-82 (1973); Goldie, International Principles of Responsibility for Pollution, 9
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 283, 307-08 (1970); T. AYLESWORTH, THIS VITAL AIR, THIs VITAL
WATER 41-42 (1968).
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the numerous well-publicized consequences of DDT usage. 13 Other
well-known instances of transboundary pollution include the Scandina-
vian black snow 14 and acid rain' 5 caused by industrial emissions in Great
Britain and West Germany, stratospheric changes produced by air traffic
and aerosols,' 6 and localized particulate emissions such as those in-
volved in the Trail Smelter arbitration.' 7 Scientists have also debated the
consequences of industrial activities and urban expansion on the earth's
albedo' 8 and climate: for example, the cooling which may result from
the blocking of sunlight by thick layers of smog; 19 the "greenhouse
effect" of an increase in the atmosphere's carbon dioxide content; 20 and
the aggravation of air pollution caused by extensive deforestation. 2 1
The inherently international nature of these effects suggests the desira-
bility of and need for international cooperation in the control of air
pollution. 22
B. Economic Context
Economists perceive air pollution as a "negative externality," a
product of industrial development the cost of which falls upon individu-
als other than those who benefit by allowing pollution to occur. 23 This
13 The DDT problem generally originates with air pollution since air is the medium
through which most pesticides are applied. For an excellent description of DDT, its proper-
ties and its consequences, see Wurster, DDT and the Environment, in AGENDA FOR SURVIVAL
(C. Wurster ed. 1970). Since DDT virtually eliminated malaria from a large part of the
developing world, its prohibition has been viewed almost as a form of genocide by certain
Third World countries.
14 The "black snow" phenomenon in Norway is described in N.Y. Times, Jan. 11,
1970, § 1, at 24, col. 1.
Is For a description of Sweden's acid rain problems, see Teclaff, The Impact of Environ-
mental Concern on the Development of International Law, 13 NAT. RESOURCES J. 357, 376 (1973);
Putting the S in Sweden, 48 NEW SCIENTIST 209 (1970); Reiquam, Sulfur: Simulated Long-
Range Transport in the Atmosphere, 170 SCIENCE 318 (1970). See Generally Ferenbaugh, Acid
Rain: Biological Effects and Implications, 4 ENVT'L AFF. 745 (1975).
16 See generally Jackson, The Dimensions of International Pollution, 50 ORE. L. REV. 223,
225-30 (1971).
17 See text accompanying notes 46-55 infra.
18 The "albedo" is the percentage of incoming solar radiation directly reflected out-
ward.
19 Ehrlich & Holdren, An Inventory of Disaster, in ECOCIDE, supra note 4, at 21, 42.
20 Passino, Report on Theme 11: Industry, in THE MANAGEMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN
TOMORROW'S EUROPE 105, 112 (Council of Europe 1971).
21 Id.
22 Burhenne & Schoenbaum, in The European Community and Management of the Envi-
ronment: A Dilemma, 13 NAT. RESOURCES J. 494 (1973), list four reasons for recent acknowl-
edgment of the need for environmental cooperation at the international level: 1) disparate
national measures can disrupt patterns of trade, 2) common resources such as the atmos-
phere demand common protective action, 3) activities taking place in one state can have an
adverse effect on persons and property in another state, and 4) the similarity of the
problems in most countries generates a cooperative search for similar solutions.
23 E.g., Loehman & Conner, Introduction: Economic Perspectives on Environmental Deci-
sions, in ECONOMICS AND DECISION MAKING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 1,4 U. CONNER
& E. LOEHMAN eds. 1974). For a discussion of possible solutions for externality problems,
see Randall, Can We Trust the Market to Solve Externality Problems?, id. at 47.
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characterization of air pollution has Jargely resulted from the traditional
view of the atmosphere as an essentially infinite resource. Because of its
supposed infinity, no price has been placed upon use of the air. Air
pollution catastrophes have demonstrated, however, that the air is not
an infinite resource, that the failure of product prices to reflect air pollu-
tion costs is essentially a subsidy to development, 24 and that prices
should be placed upon air use. Prices in the United States, for example,
have taken the form of criminal fines, civil penalties, and forced expen-
ditures on pollution control devices such as electrostatic precipitators
(which are indirectly required by air quality standards). Because these
prices raise the cost of production, product prices increase and the ex-
ternalities (or at least part of them) are "internalized."
A number of international trade consequences may arise from these
and other domestic attempts to impose polluting costs upon producers.
Measures taken by one country may place its own producers at a com-
petitive disadvantage with respect to producers in other countries. As a
protective device, the "clean" country may then decide to impose im-
port tariffs on articles imported from countries which have not adopted
identical or similar environmental measures. 25 The tariff mechanism,
however, introduces a number of additional international trade compli-
cations, one of which derives from the fact that the atmospheric envi-
ronments of different countries are likely to have different assimilative
capacities. 26 For example, a flat, low-lying country may find it
unnecessary to adopt measures as strict as those used by a country with
mountain ranges and valleys in which air temperature inversions are
common.27 Tariff barriers set up by the mountainous country would
obstruct the efficient allocation of the world's resources. Were the
market allowed to operate freely, the likely result would be the
allocation of high-pollution industries to the country with the greater
atmospheric assimilative capacity and a net increase in world output. 
28
24 Taubenfeld, supra note 5, at 325.
25 A distinction should be drawn between extractive or manufacturing activities and
consumptive activities. The external costs (negative externalities) associated with con-
sumptive activities are the same whether the product is of foreign or domestic manufac-
ture. The costs occur where the product is consumed in either case. But with respect to
extractive or manufacturing industries, the external costs occur where the goods are pro-
duced or extracted. Thus, measures taken to impose external costs upon consumptive
activities should not affect the competitive position of domestic producers, (e.g., both
foreign and domestic products should be subject to the same surcharge); and tariffs on
foreign products (which are not applicable to similar domestic goods) could be appropriate
only if a similar good were not produced domestically and if it were not possible to tax or
otherwise restrict the externality-generating activity itself. See D'Arge & Kneese, Environ-
mental Quality and International Trade, in WORLD Eco-CRIsIS, supra note 6, at 255, 266-72.
26 See, e.g., MacDonald, International Institutions for Environmental Management, id. at
207, 219.
27 A short description of temperature inversion is contained in R. DASMANN, EN-
VIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION 353 (3d ed. 1972).
28 D'Arge & Kneese, supra note 25, at 266-67.
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A number of more subtle international trade consequences may
result from domestic environmental efforts. A law passed by West Ger-
many in the early 1970's limited the lead content of gasoline to .15 grams
per liter.29 Since many foreign cars could not then be adjusted to low
lead gasoline, this law had the effect of restricting the sales of foreign
automobiles in West Germany.30 The United States nonleaded gasoline
rules have had a different impact: they discourage some U.S. tourists
from traveling in Mexico where unleaded gasoline may not be avail-
able. 31 In the industrial sector, sulfur dioxide emissions standards may
require the use of equipment which removes sulfur from stack gases.
Such standards not only increase the international demand for low sul-
fur fuels, but also result in increased sulfur recovery. The recovered
sulfur is marketable and therefore is likely to diminish the demand for
imported sulfur. 32 A similar reduction in international trade is likely to
result from other recycling measures. The ongoing Concorde con-
troversy also demonstrates the serious international trade consequences
that can result from seemingly inoffensive domestic efforts to protect
environmental quality. 33
II. International Environmental Law
A. General Principles of International Law
The goal of air pollution control mechanisms should be the preven-
tion of pollution, 34 because prevention is likely to be less expensive than
post-pollution cleanup, 35 and because complete restoration of the at-
mosphere to its original condition is often impossible. The existing prin-
ciples of state responsibility which seek to compensate persons injured
by polluting activities do, in some cases, encourage pollution preven-
tion.36 However, these principles are not based on a philosophy of pre-
vention. Since imposition of liability depends on the bargaining position
of the injured party, existing international law often does not provide
the incentive necessary to promote pollution prevention.
37
29 See Sterling, Depolluting Autos Is Complex Issue, Washington Post, Nov. 9, 1971, at
A18, Col. 5.
30 D'Arge & Kneese, supra note 25, at 274.
31 MacDonald, supra note 26, at 220.
32 Id. at 224-25.
33 See British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of N.Y., 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1977); Legal and
Environmental Ramifications of the Concorde, 42 J. AIR L. 433 (1976).
34 Bloomfield, The Pollution Problem, 21 U. TORONTO L. J. 175 (1971); Tarlock, supra note
6, at 348-49; Bleicher, An Overview of International Environmental Regulation, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q.
1, 5 (1972); Kiss, Efforts to Control Air Pollution at International Level, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF
AIR POLLUTION CONTROL 16, 45 (Council of Europe, Committee of Experts on Air Pollution
1972).
35 Goldman, supra note 7, at 9.
36 See text accompanying notes 55-58, infra.
37 An injured plaintiff must, for example, have the financial resources to bring his
claim. Moreover, for everyone there is a threshold injury cost below which it is not
worthwhile to bring suit.
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Although there are no principles of international law explicitly relat-
ing to air pollution, several sets of rules are relevant. First, territorial
sovereignty recognizes that a state generally has free rein with respect to
the use and enjoyment of resources located within its territory. 3 This
freedom is limited, however, by a state's responsibility to see that ac-
tivities within its territory do not cause injury to other states.3 9 Second,
the concept of the freedom of the seas40 and its equivalent with respect
to outer space4 1 may be viewed as precedents for the application of a
similar set of rules to the use of the atmosphere, at least to the atmos-
phere above the open seas. Such an application would not be environ-
mentally sound in all respects, since it would permit reasonable use of
the atmosphere by each state. 42 Differing opinions on the meaning of
"reasonable use" are inevitable and would make effective enforcement
impossible. These principles have meaning, of course, only in relation to
the rules governing state responsibility43 and, unfortunately, the law of
state responsibility has not developed much beyond the protection of
aliens and their property. 44
Three prominent international cases have involved the transbound-
ary environmental implications of particular domestic activities. 45 Of
these cases, only the earliest of them, the Trail Smelter arbitration,4 6 dealt
specifically with air pollution issues. Trail Smelter was resolved pursuant
to the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty47 between the United States and
Canada, which created the International Joint Commission to deal with
Canadian-American disputes over boundary waters. At the time of Trail
38 Brownlie, supra note 12, at 179; Handl, Territorial Sovereignty and the Problem of
Transnational Pollution, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 50, 54 (1975).
39 Id. at 55-58; Brownlie, supra note 12, at 179, 183; Kiss, supra note 34, at 18.
40 Brownlie, supra note 12, at 179. See Legault, The Freedom of the Seas: A License to
Pollute?, 21 U. TORONTo L.J. 211 (1971).
41 Brownlie, supra note 12, at 179.
42 Id. at 180. Cf. Bourne, International Law and Pollution of International Rivers and Lakes,
21 U. TORONTO L.J. 193, 195-96 (1971).
43 See generally Hoffman, State Responsibility in International Law and Transboundary Pol-
lution Injuries, 25 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 509 (1976).
44 Id. at 510. It should be noted that we are speaking here of public international law.
Parties injured by foreign sources of transboundary pollution can, of course, pursue their
claims in the domestic courts.
45 Lake Lanoux Arbitration, 12 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 281 (1963); Corfu Channel, [1949]
I.C. J. 4; Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1941), 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684
(1941). In Handelswekerij Bier v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace (Mar. 12, 1975), the Rotter-
dam Court found itself jurisdictionally incompetent to decide the substantive issues be-
cause it found that the injurious event had occured in France and not in the Netherlands.
The case dealt with pollution of the Rhine by a French potash mining works, and is
discussed in Rest, Transfrontier Environmental Damages, 1 ENVT'L POL'Y L. 127 (1975). A case
concerning the legality of French atmospheric nuclear testing in the South Pacific is appar-
ently still pending before the International Court of Justice. The issues raised by the
parties are examined in Handl, supra note 38.
46 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1941).
47 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), T. S. No. 548.
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Smelter, the Commission had no specific authority to handle air pollu-
tion disputes 48 but the two countries gave the Commission ad hoc au-
thority to hear the dispute. The case involved damage from air pollution
to persons in the State of Washington caused by sulfur dioxide emitted
by a privately owned Canadian smelter plant. 49 In giving the Commis-
sion authority the parties in effect agreed to "transmute" 0 the claims
against the smelter, into international obligations and to waive the pro-
visions of international law on exhaustion of domestic remedies.51 These
factors limit the otherwise expansive reach of the tribunal's holding, 2
which boldly asserts that, as a matter of international law, (1) a state may
not use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause
serious transnational injury5 3 and (2) state responsibility is imposed
even when the source of injury is private.5 4
The philosophical basis of the Trail Smelter decision and of other
international law principles is clearly not preventive in nature; the vari-
ous rules permit activities that create pollution to continue if resulting
damages are compensated.55 Another shortcoming of the general rules
of law is their inadequacy to deal with non-catastrophic environmental
injury, i.e., that caused by pollution accumulation.5 6 In the case of this
kind of injury, the damage done by particular sources may be infin-
itesimal, yet the total injury may be considerable.5 7 These factors dem-
onstrate that, even though general principles of international law offer
some remedy to parties injured by pollution, international agreements
are needed to establish affirmative environmental policies. 5 8
48 The Commission's jurisdiction has been extended to air pollution disputes. Rempe,
International Air Pollution - United States and Canada -A Joint Approach, 10 ARIZ. L. REV. 138,
143 (1968); Kiss, supra note 34, at 19.
49 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1917.
5o Hoffman, supra note 43, at 512, 516; Bleicher, supra note 34, at 21-22. A state is
ordinarily responsible only for its own actions, not for those of private individuals (who
are classically not subjects of international law). In this case, the states agreed to waive this
limitation, thereby transmuting the private claim into a public international law claim. Id.
51 Hoffman, supra note 43, at 516-17, 523-41; Bleicher, supra note 34, at 22.
52 It has been stated, for example, that the Commission "transformed itself wholly
from the creature of a rather restrictive compromis to an international court." Rubin, Pollu-
tion by Analogy: The Trail Smelter Arbitration, 50 ORE. L. REV. 259, 264 (1971).
53 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1973-74.
54 Id.
55 Id., Bleicher, supra note 34, at 25.
56 Yates, Unilateral and Multilateral Approaches to Environmental Problems, 21 U. To-
RONTO L.J. 182, 183-86 (1971).
57 Mattes, Liability for Harm to the Enviroment, 1 ENVT'L POL'Y L. 17, 18 (1975). Interna-
tional law requires proof of material damage as a precondition to imposition of state
responsibility. Handi, supra note 38, at 75. To these shortcomings, add the jurisdic-
tional locus delicti problem brought out by the Rotterdam Court, supra note 45.
58 See, e.g., Kiss, supra note 34, at 20. Cf. Yates, supra note 56, at 189. In Hoffman, supra
note 43, at 542, the author argues that "[a] legal framework does indeed exist for the
development of a world environmental order and that framework will only be
strengthened through use."
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B. Conventional International Law
International conventions can deal with air pollution in three ways.
First, treaties may be drafted that impose obligations directly on the
parties to create institutions empowered to issue binding regulations.5 9
Second, conventionally-created institutions may be given the power to
issue binding directives. 60 Third, international organizations can pre-
pare and adopt resolutions and recommendations whose purpose is to
encourage states to adopt uniform domestic legislation. 6 1 The potential
effectiveness of the third method should not be underestimated; na-
tional self-interest provides a strong incentive for compliance with in-
ternationally drafted rules. 62
The UNEP's Register of International Conventions and Protocols in
the Field of the Environment 63 is conspicuously devoid of any agree-
ments specifically dealing with air pollution, except for the Treaty Ban-
ning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water. 64 Perhaps the most active international air pollution activ-
ites have been undertaken by the European Community. 65 The treaty
establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) nowhere refers
to environmental protection, but Article 235 provides:
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in
the course of the operation of the Common Market, one of the objec-
tives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the neces-
sary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal
from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly, take the
appropriate measures. 66
The Preamble states as one of the EEC's objectives the "constant im-
provement of the living and working conditions of their peoples," while
Article Two adds "an accelerated raising of the standard of living."
These provisions have been suggested as a basis for Community action
in the environmental area. 67
5 9 See, e.g., Article 54(1) of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, 15
U.N.T.S. 295 (1953), which gives the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
authority to adopt Standards, Recommending Practices and Procedures (SARPS); Brown,
The Conventional Law of the Environment, 13 NAT. RESOURCES J. 203, 215 (1973).
60 See, e.g., note 66 infra; Burhenne & Schoenbaum, supra note 22, at 495.
61 Id.; Brown, supra note 59, at 209.
62 E. SKOLNIKOFF, THE INTERNATIONAL IMPERATIVES OF TECHNOLOGY 129-30 (1972).
63 U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC/INFORMATION/5 (1977).
64 [1963] 2 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433. To this could be added the Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biolog-
ical) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, opened for signature April 10, 1972, [1975]
1 U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. No. 8062.
65 See note 60 supra.
66 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 235,
298 U.N.T.S. 11.
67 Commission of the European Communities, First Communication on Community
Policy Concerning the Environment, Doc. SEC (71), 2616 final, adopted July 22, 1971.
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The potential influence of the EEC on environmental problems is
increased by its power to make non-binding recommendations and to
issue directives that bind member states. 68 Under Article 189 of the
Treaty, the directives specify the result to be achieved; the means are left
to the discretion of the national authorities. 69 A Directive issued in 1970,
for example, detailed uniform emissions standards for vehicles
equipped with positive-ignition engines. 7 0
Although few agreements specifically dealing with air pollution
exist, a large number of international agreements have been signed relat-
ing to environmental concerns.7 1 Most of the conventions include sec-
tions: (1) establishing liability on the part of the operators of specified
activities, (2) requiring state regulation of private operations, (3) propos-
ing minimum standards or guidelines, (4) requiring operators to provide
and demonstrate financial capacity to compensate potential losses, (5)
setting up procedures to dispose of claims, and (6) permitting protective
measures to be undertaken by potential victim states whereby the total
injury to all can be minimized. 72 It has been suggested that one broad-
ranging agreement applying to all forms of transnational environmental
injury would not be impossible to draft and would provide a far more
effective solution to the currently existing uncertainties of general inter-
national law. 73
C. International Organizations
Numerous UN agencies have undertaken a small amount of activity
in the environmental field, but the non-environmental focus of the
agencies involved has affected most of these efforts. 74 The World
Meteorological Organization (WMO) is concerned with the atmosphere
and atmospheric processes, and particularly with weather and climate. 75
In 1969, WMO approved a plan for measuring a number of atmospheric
pollutants - the Global Atmospheric Research Program (GARP). 76 The
World Weather Watch, 77 another activity of the WMO, provided the
logical framework and background experience for the establishment of
68 See Brown, supra note 59, at 207.
69 European Economic Community Treaty, supra note 66, at art. 189.
70 EEC Directive 70/220/CEE, Mar. 20, 1970; J.O. No. L76, April 6, 1970.
71 Some of these deal with specific environmental problems while others deal with
general environmental concerns. See the listing provided in the UNEP's Register of Inter-
national Conventions, supra note 63.
72 Bleicher, supra note 34, at 50-51.
73 Id. at 51.
74 See, e.g., T. WILSON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION: A GLOBAL SURVEY
47 (1971); Bleicher, supra note 34, at 3.
7- See Davies, The Role of the WMO in Environmental Issues, in WORLD Eco-CRIsIs, supra
note 6, at 161, 165.
76 UNEP, Report of the Executive Director, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC/90 (1977).
77 G.A. Res. 1721 C., 16 U.N. GAOR (Dec. 20, 1961).
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the global environmental monitoring system (GEMS), created by the
1975 Conference on the Human Environment. 78
The World Health Organization (WHO) has shown an interest in
the health aspects of air pollution,7 9 having established a Working
Group on Atmospheric Pollution and an international network of air
pollution information centers.8 0 WHO and the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) have started a joint Codex Alimentarius Commis-
sion, which has done some work in the area of pesticides and other
chemical pollutants. 81
A resolution of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO)a2 recognized that the agency was "conscious of the adverse
environmental impacts that may be related to aircraft activity and of its
responsibility and that of its Member States to achieve maximum com-
patibility between the safe and orderly development of civil aviation and
the quality of the human environment. '8 3 This concern is displayed in
ICAO's Aircraft Master Planning Manual which stresses the need for
long term airport planning to include an assessment of the plan's poten-
tial impact on the airport's environment. a4 The ICAO is in the unique
position of having the authority to create rules (SARPS) that are binding
on its members.85 NATO's Committee on the Challenges of Modern
Society has established an Air Quality Criteria Panel.8 6
The UN Conference on the Environment, 7 held in Stockholm in
1972, did not produce any specific air pollution standards or agree-
ments, but it did provide the momentum for several atmosphere-related
activities. Among these is the Earthwatch Programme with its compo-
nents: the Global Environmental Monitoring System (GEMS) and the
International Referral System (IRS).88 The most significant result of the
Conference was, of course, the creation of a new UN Agency (UNEP)
with a focus on environmental concerns and with the responsibility for
coordinating all UN activities relating to the environment. 89
78 See note 88 infra.
7 See, e.g., WHO, Problems of the Environment, Report by the Director-General,
U.N. Doc. A24/A/3 (1971); Kiss, supra note 34, at 21, 26.
80 UNEP, Report of the Executive Director, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC90 (1977); Kiss, supra
note 34, at 27.
81 Kiss, supra note 34, at 27.
82 15 U.N.T.S. 295 (1953).
83 ICAO Res. A18-11.
84 ICAO, AIRPORT MASTER PLANNING MANUAL (1969).
85 Brown, supra note 59, at 214-15.
86 Kiss, supra note 34, at 24. See generally Sudarskis, NATO and the Environment: A
Challenge for a Challenger, 2 ENVT'L POL'Y & L. 69 (1976).
87 See notes 2-3 supra.
88 Mattes, The U.N. Environment Programme, 1 ENVT'L POL'Y & L. 53,54 (1975). GEMS
is concerned with global environmental monitoring, while the task of IRS is information
referral.
89 See note 3 supra, and accompanying text.
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The World Bank, 90 the Swedish International Development Author-
ity, the United States Agency for International Development, and the
United Nations Development Program9 1 also have environment-related
concerns. These organizations have indicated their intention to include
environmental considerations in the planning and appraisal of projects
prepared by or submitted to them for financing. Developing nations
view these policies with skepticism 92 and are quick to characterize them
as "cultural imperialism. ,93
III. Proposals and Prospects
International air pollution would be controlled best by a com-
prehensive program of world resource management, an unattainable
ideal. 94 In light of the failure of developed countries to effectively man-
age their natural resources, 95 the expectancy or hope that all nations
could combine to do better is unrealistic.
Many proposals for international pollution control contemplate the
division of pollution problems into at least three categories: (1) those
that are almost completely localized in nature and therefore should be
handled by domestic legislation; (2) those that involved a limited
number of national jurisdictions, i.e., those that are regional in nature;
and (3) those that necessarily impact on the resources that all nations
share in common, or that require international cooperation for control. 96
However, existing notions of national sovereignty and the seemingly
insurmountable barrier existing between the developed and developing
nations dictate that to be successful, action must be taken by national
goverments. 97 Ad hoc regional arrangements would be established to
90 Lee, Environmental Considerations in Development Finance, in WORLD Eco-CRIsIS,
supra note 6, at 171, 177-78.
91 See generally id.
92 Castro, supra note 6, at 248. The developing nations have also viewed unconditional
grants of aid for anti-pollution efforts with skepticism. Among other reasons, they fear
that the money spent in this fashion will reduce the amount of financial aid available for
development activities. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 10-11 (1972).
Of course, the environmental concerns of the developed nations may have beneficial
effects on developing nations. The concern for global pollution may create a "one world"
feeling that could lead to efforts to alleviate poverty throughout the world. Criticism of the
pollution effects from making synthetics may increase the demand for the natural resource
products of developing countries. Strict environmental controls in developed countries
may encourage high residuals industries to locate in the Third World. See D'Arge &
Kneese, supra note 25, at 259-60.
93 Taubenfeld, supra note 5, at 325; See STOCKHOLM AND BEYOND, supra note 7, at 120.
94 E.g., Yates, supra note 56, at 186.
95 STOCKHOLM AND BEYOND, supra note 7, at 120.
96 See, e.g., Yates, supra note 56, at 186-89; Johnson, The United Nations' Institutional
Response to Stockholm, in WORLD Eco-CRISIS, supra note 6, at 115-21; MacDonald, supra note
26, at 209-10. Cf. Tarlock, supra note 6, at 348.
97 See, e.g., Jackson, The Dimensions of International Pollution, 50 ORE. L. REV. 223, 231
(1971); Gardner, The Role of the UN in Environmental Problems, in WORLD Eco-CRIsIs, supra
note 6, at 70-73.
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deal with particular pollution problems, 98 and international agencies
would be used for those level three problems that cannot be handled
adequately on a regional or domestic basis. 99
More radical proposals have insisted that mere "tinkering" with
existing institutions is not enough 0 0 and that basic attitudes must be
changed, 10 1 e.g., the earth must be viewed as a closed world ("Space-
ship Earth").1 0 2 Optimists, however, argue that the existing system
based upon national self interest can adequately guarantee adherence to
international rules. 1 0 3
A recent proposal has suggested the establishment of a World
Habeas Ecologicus (WHE). 104 This would consist of an International
Tribunal and a number of international and national commissions with
panels situated throughout the globe. Whenever a government made a
decision, to act or not to act, that endangered the international environ-
ment, the Commission would be authorized to invoke a writ of WHE
before municipal authorities to seek injunctive relief. After exhausting
municipal remedies, the Commission could appeal to the International
Tribunal.
IV. Conclusion
The international control of air pollution remains a frontier topic in
the field of international law. The responsibility of states for pollution
beyond their borders has not yet been fully developed. 1 05 Few treaties
and conventions have directly confronted the problems posed by air
pollution. Air pollution-related efforts by international organizations
have proceeded on a. relatively piecemeal basis. Moreover, until the
developed countries have sincerely demonstrated their concern for the
environment, it is unreasonable to expect any substantial progress to be
made in the area of air pollution, except perhaps with respect to particu-
lar transboundary problems or where a great deal of economic integra-
tion exists.
98 See, e.g., MacDonald, supra note 26, at 226-28; Kiss, supra note 34, at 45; Johnson,
supra note 96, at 117.
99 See generally Lee, supra note 90; Bleicher, supra note 34, at 7-8.
100 Murdoch & Connell, The Ecologist's Role and the Nonsolution of Technology, in
ECOCIDE, supra note 4, at 47, 58-60; J. Tinbergen et al., eds., supra note 8, at 11 (1976).
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Concept of Stewardship, in R. COOLEY & G. WANDESFORDE-SMITH, CONGRESS AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT 205 (1970); King, The Environmental Bandwagon, in EcoCIDE, supra note 4, at 189,
195-96.
102 D. MEADOWS, THE LIMITS TO GROWTH 124, 127 (1972); B. WARD & R. DUBOS, ONLY
ONE EARTH: THE CARE AND MAINTENANCE OF A SMALL PLANET 191-95(1972).
103 See text accompanying note 62 supra.
104 Kutner, The Control and Prevention of Transnational Pollution: A Case for World Habeas
Ecologicus, 9 LAW. AM. 257 (1977).
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